Bush Sneaks in Vetoes Under a Veil of Formality
While the Bush administration has publicly avoided vetoes, it openly uses a 'ceremonial' policy to effect the same outcome.
(PRWEB) August 18, 2005
An article published in the latest issue of Presidential Studies Quarterly discusses how the Bush administration used a little-known policy tool of attaching presidential signing statements to bills to, in essence, veto them.
The statements serve to increase presidential authority while rejecting that of Congress. Presidential signing statements alter specific provisions of legislation without sending bills back for possible veto overrides. This is as effective and substantive as a line-item veto and can nullify a range of statutory provisions even as a president signs the legislation that contained them into law.
While the present administration is not the first to use the presidential signing statements, it has very effectively expanded the scope and character of the statement to nullify and reposition the powers of the presidency to Congress. Author Phillip J. CooperÂs study of the first term of the Bush administration reveals wide-ranging and systematic use of the statements to yield and define exclusive authority.
Presidential statements, by definition, are pronouncements issued by the president when a congressional enactment is signed. In addition to providing general commentary, the statements provide the presidentÂs interpretation of the language of the law, announce constitutional limits on the implementation of some of its provisions, and/or indicate directions on administering the new law in an acceptable manner. These statements inform the relevant agency head of the administrationÂs objections.
ÂThat, of course, means that they are to act in the manner that the administration considers appropriate as compared to the way the legislation sets forth by policy, Dr. Cooper explains. In taking advantage of this power, the president leaves Congress with few response options unless it is willing to pass entirely new legislation, which in turn would create a stronger veto threat.
This article is published in the September issue of Presidential Studies Quarterly.
Presidential Studies Quarterly is the only scholarly journal that focuses on the most powerful political figure in the world - the president of the United States. It is published by the Center for the Study of the Presidency.
Phillip J. Cooper is a professor of Public Administration in the Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University. He was the first recipient of the Charles Levine Award given by the American Society for Public Administration and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration for excellence in public affairs scholarship, teaching, and service. He has authored numerous books and articles on sustainable development administration, public administration, administrative law, constitutional law, law and public policy, environmental policy, and health care policy. Dr. Cooper is available for questions and interviews.
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